QBOM platforms: evaluation criteria for quantum-readiness inventory
Scanners find cryptography. A platform has to turn many scans into one trusted, versioned inventory that drives migration decisions and audit evidence. These are the criteria that separate the two.
- Evaluate platforms against the work you must evidence: CERT-In fields, government inventory guidance and your migration plan.
- Standards support for CycloneDX cryptographic properties and SPDX is the baseline, not a differentiator.
- Look for ingestion from several discovery methods and correlation with existing asset inventories.
- The platform must capture business context such as data lifetime, which no scanner can find.
- Treat claims of certified quantum-safety with caution; an inventory platform documents readiness.
What a QBOM platform is for
A QBOM platform sits above discovery tools. Its job is to hold an accurate, access-controlled inventory of cryptographic and quantum components, keep it current and turn it into prioritised work and evidence. CERT-In's best practices describe the target state well: a single, access-controlled inventory for all cryptographic assets and quantum components, with version control, dependency mapping, automation and periodic risk assessment [1]. The criteria below follow from that and from government migration guidance.
Evaluation criteria
| Area | What to check | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Formats | Imports and exports CycloneDX (including 1.6 cryptoProperties) and SPDX without losing fields | CERT-In recommends SPDX or CycloneDX [1]; CycloneDX 1.6 models algorithms, certificates, protocols and related crypto material [2] |
| Field validation | Can enforce CERT-In Table 8 QBOM elements and Table 9 CBOM fields as policy, and report gaps | Missing fields are the most common audit finding for any BOM |
| Discovery coverage | Ingests results from code, binary, container, network and PKI discovery, and records which source found each asset | The CISA, NSA and NIST factsheet calls for discovery across network protocols, end-user systems and development pipelines [3] |
| Correlation | Links crypto assets to software components, hardware, business services and existing asset inventories | The factsheet recommends correlating findings with existing asset inventories [3] |
| Business context | Captures data type, confidentiality lifetime, owner and hosting per system | OMB M-23-02 asks for data lifecycle and hosting details per system [4] |
| Policy mapping | Rules for quantum-vulnerable algorithms and target algorithms, mapped to NIST IR 8547, CNSA 2.0 or internal standards | Turns an inventory into a gap list against the timeline you follow |
| Versioning | Version history and diffs of every BOM, with who changed what and when | CERT-In recommends version control and change management for CBOMs and QBOMs [1] |
| Vulnerability and VEX | Correlates components with vulnerability data and records VEX status (Not Affected, Affected, Fixed, Under Investigation) | CERT-In expects CBOM/QBOM data to be cross-referenced with VEX status [1] |
| Security of the inventory | Encryption, access control and integrity for stored and transmitted BOMs | A crypto inventory is a map for attackers; CERT-In requires it be protected [1] |
| Deployment | On-premise, private cloud or air-gapped options | Regulated and defence environments may not allow inventory data to leave the estate |
| Evidence | Timestamped exports mapped to framework controls | Auditors and regulators ask for proof of state at a point in time |
Questions for a proof of concept
- Import a CBOM from an open-source scanner (see QBOM tools). Are all crypto properties preserved on export?
- Import two versions of the same system. Does the diff show a key-size change or an algorithm swap clearly?
- Mark a data set as needing confidentiality beyond 2035. Does its quantum-vulnerable key exchange rise in priority automatically?
- Load a supplier's QBOM with missing fields. Does the platform flag the gaps against CERT-In's Table 8?
- Produce the evidence pack for one business service. Is it timestamped and reproducible?
Signals to treat with caution
- "Quantum-safe certified" inventories. An inventory platform documents readiness; it does not make cryptography quantum-safe. Check any certification claim against the issuing body.
- Proprietary-only formats. If the QBOM cannot leave the platform in CycloneDX or SPDX, you cannot share it with regulators or suppliers.
- Scanner-only scoring. A score that ignores data lifetime and business criticality will rank the wrong systems first. See Quantum risk assessment.
NIST's NCCoE migration project has published preliminary drafts on cryptographic discovery tools (SP 1800-38B) that are a useful reference for testing discovery claims [5].
How IntelliXBOM helps
IntelliXBOM generates and ingests BOMs in CycloneDX and SPDX, validates them against required-field policies such as CERT-In's, and keeps version history and diffs. It correlates cryptographic assets with vulnerabilities, licences, end-of-life data and business services, records VEX decisions, and produces timestamped evidence mapped to framework controls. It can be self-hosted on-premise, in private cloud or air-gapped.
Frequently asked questions
What is the difference between a QBOM tool and a QBOM platform?
A tool usually performs one job, such as scanning source code for cryptographic calls. A platform aggregates results from many tools, adds business context such as data lifetime and ownership, keeps history and produces evidence.
Which standards should a QBOM platform support?
At minimum CycloneDX, including the version 1.6 cryptographic properties, and SPDX, since CERT-In recommends both. It should also be able to validate CERT-In's QBOM and CBOM minimum elements.
Should a QBOM platform be self-hosted?
It depends on your environment. A cryptographic inventory reveals where weak keys and algorithms sit, so many regulated and defence organisations prefer on-premise or air-gapped deployment, and CERT-In asks that CBOM/QBOM data be protected with encryption and access control.
Sources
- Technical Guidelines on SBOM, QBOM & CBOM, AIBOM and HBOM, Version 2.0 (9 July 2025)CERT-In, Government of Indiawww.cert-in.org.in/PDF/TechnicalGuidelines-on-SBOM,QBOM&CBOM,AIBOM_and_HBOM_ver2.0.pdf
- CycloneDX 1.6 JSON schema (cryptoProperties)OWASP CycloneDX on GitHubgithub.com/CycloneDX/specification/blob/1.6/schema/bom-1.6.schema.json
- Quantum-Readiness: Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (August 2023)CISA, NSA and NISTwww.nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/quantum-readiness-fact-sheet.pdf
- OMB M-23-02, Migrating to Post-Quantum Cryptography (November 2022)The White House, Office of Management and Budgetwww.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/M-23-02-M-Memo-on-Migrating-to-Post-Quantum-Cryptography.pdf
- Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography project (SP 1800-38)NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellencewww.nccoe.nist.gov/crypto-agility-considerations-migrating-post-quantum-cryptographic-algorithms
Sources checked in September 2026. Regulations and guidance change; always refer to the issuing body’s current publication. This content is for general information and is not legal advice.