CBOM platforms: evaluation criteria for enterprise cryptographic inventory

Scanners find cryptography; a platform turns scan results into a governed inventory. These are the criteria to test before choosing one.

Scanner or platform?

An open-source scanner answers "what cryptography is in this repository or on this endpoint?". An enterprise needs answers to broader questions: what is used across all systems, who owns it, what breaks policy, what changed since last quarter and what evidence can be shown to an auditor. A CBOM platform is the layer that answers those questions. CISA's strategy on automated cryptography discovery and inventory tools frames the inventory as something collected from multiple automated and manual sources and reported over time ^[4], which is the job a platform does.

The criteria below are vendor-neutral. Use them to build a scoring sheet and test each one with your own data during a proof of concept. For open-source discovery options, see CBOM tools.

1. Discovery coverage and ingestion

• Which sources can it ingest: source-code scan results, container and binary analysis, network scans, HSM and KMS exports, PKI and certificate stores, supplier CBOMs?
• Can it import output from tools you already run, rather than requiring its own agents everywhere?
• Does it deduplicate the same certificate or algorithm seen from several sources?
• How does it record assets it cannot see directly, such as cryptography inside third-party appliances?

2. Standards support

• CycloneDX CBOM. Import and export of cryptographic-asset components with cryptoProperties for all four asset types, algorithm, certificate, protocol and related-crypto-material ^[2]. Ask whether it handles CycloneDX 1.7's algorithm-family and elliptic-curve registries, released in October 2025 ^[3].
• CERT-In minimum elements. Can it validate each asset against the fields in Table 9 of CERT-In's Version 2.0 guidelines and report which are missing ^[1]? See CERT-In CBOM requirements.
• SBOM linkage. Can cryptographic assets be linked to the software components that implement them?

3. Policy evaluation

• Ships with rules reflecting public baselines, such as RFC 8996's deprecation of TLS 1.0 and 1.1 ^[5] and NIST SP 800-131A Rev. 2's 112-bit minimum security strength ^[6].
• Lets you write your own rules, for example, "no RSA below 3072 bits for new keys", and apply them by environment or business unit.
• Records exceptions with an owner, rationale and expiry date rather than silently suppressing findings.

4. Ownership and business context

• Every asset linked to an application, a business service and a named owner.
• Prioritisation that combines cryptographic weakness with exposure (internet-facing or internal) and business criticality.
• Integration with ticketing so findings reach the teams who fix them.

5. Key and certificate lifecycle

• Key state tracking aligned to the states in NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5, pre-activation, active, suspended, deactivated, compromised, destroyed ^[9].
• Certificate expiry forecasting and alerts routed to owners.
• Integration with existing certificate management and PKI rather than duplicating it; see CBOM vs certificate management.

6. History, drift and validation

• Version history of every CBOM and diffs between versions, so new weak cryptography or removed controls are visible.
• Completeness scoring: how much of the known estate has a current CBOM. CERT-In recommends reviews at least quarterly ^[1].

7. Post-quantum readiness

• Flags quantum-vulnerable algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, finite-field DH), with the NIST IR 8547 draft's 2030 and 2035 milestones available as a reference timeline ^[7].
• Prioritisation by data lifetime, as SEBI's CSCRF FAQs describe prioritising migration by risk, asset criticality, information sensitivity and exposure ^[10].
• Tracks migration over years and supports the crypto-agility practices described in NIST CSWP 39 ^[8].

8. Evidence and reporting

• Maps inventory and findings to framework controls and produces timestamped evidence.
• Exports that a regulator, auditor or customer can read without access to the platform.

9. Deployment and data protection

A CBOM describes exactly where an organisation's cryptography is weak. CERT-In recommends that CBOM data be stored and transmitted with encryption, access control and integrity mechanisms (rec. 8.4.1.12) ^[1]. Check whether the platform can run on-premise, in a private cloud or fully air-gapped, how it controls access, and whether it can sign or hash exported BOMs.

Running a proof of concept

1. Choose two or three representative applications, including one internet-facing and one legacy system.
2. Feed in real scan output and one supplier CBOM.
3. Measure completeness against CERT-In fields, false positives and time to assign owners.
4. Change a configuration and confirm that the drift is detected.
5. Generate the evidence pack you would give an auditor.

How IntelliXBOM helps

IntelliXBOM generates and ingests CBOMs in CycloneDX and SPDX, validates them against required-field policies including CERT-In fields, and keeps version history and diffs. It correlates cryptographic assets with vulnerabilities, end-of-life data and business services, maps inventory to framework controls with timestamped evidence, and can be self-hosted on-premise, in a private cloud or air-gapped.